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Pride Stables ("Pride") hereby submits this Reply Brief'in further support of its 
appeal. 
REBUTTAL TO HOMESTEAD DEFENDANTS' FACTUAL ASSERTIONS 
Throughout their Brief, Appellees Homestead Golf Club, Inc., Gerald R. Sanders and 
Great Inns of the Rockies, Inc. (collectively referred to as "Homestead Defendants") misstate 
a number of crucial facts. Pride will correct those errors as follows: 
1. Throughout their Brief Homestead Defendants state that they never admitted 
to having promised to loan Pride $185,000. Homestead Defendants are mistaken because 
in the Federal Action, the parties stipulated in the Pretrial Order to the following 
uncontro verted fact: "Plaintiff [Homestead] and Defendant [Pride Stables] orally agreed 
that Plaintiff would lend Defendant the sum of $185,000 so that Defendant could make 
payment to certain of its secured creditors." (R. 1352). 
2. Throughout their Brief, Homestead Defendants state that they never contended 
that the promised $ 185,000 loan only applied to the Clark-Pride Property and not to the 14th 
Hole Property. Homestead Defendants are mistaken because during the course of the 
Federal Action, Homestead Defendants took the position that this promise to loan Pride 
$185,000 related only to the Clark-Pride Property. (Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Pride 
Stables, 224 F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
3. Throughout their Brief Homestead Defendants state that the 10th Circuit 
determined that there was no agreement for them to make a $185,000 loan to Pride. 
Homestead Defendants are mistaken because the 10th Circuit affirmed the District Court's 
1 
finding that there was no enforceable (i.e., express) contract between the parties, not that 
there had never been a promise by Homestead Defendants to loan Pride $185,000, which is 
an important distinction. (R. 1386; Homestead, 224 F.2d at 1195). 
4. Throughout their Brief, Homestead Defendants state that at the time they 
received the June 15,1988 Letter of Commitment from Pride they did not know that Pride's 
lenders would not subordinate. Homestead Defendants are mistaken because on June 8, 
1988, Homestead Defendants' Vice President Stroud met with the co-owner of the Clark-
Pride Property, Cal Clark, and his attorney, Grant McFarlane, Jr., and during that meeting, 
Stroud was told that Clark could not obtain subordination from lien holders on the Clark-
Pride Property. (R. 1337, 1412-13).1 
5. Throughout their Brief, Homestead Defendants state that they were prepared 
to go forward with the promised loan but Pride refused to sign the loan documents, 
including a "Master Lease Agreement" Homestead Defendants are mistaken because Pride 
was unable to sign the loan documents since they contained the onerous subordination 
1
 That discussion occurred because Clark had received a $100,000 loan from 
Homestead Defendants which he used to discharge a personal obligation to Valley Bank. 
Stroud thus knew about the unwillingness of the other banks to subordinate any loans 
which Homestead Defendants made to Clark or to Pride prior to Pride's execution of the 
Letter of Commitment on June 15, 1988, and this included the all-important Davis 
County Bank. (R. 1337, 1412-13). Homestead Defendants' misrepresentation of this 
knowledge is evidence of their fraudulent intent. See McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust 
Company, 779 F.2d 916, 921-22 (3rd Cir. 1985); Shapakv. Shertle, 629 A.2d 763, 772 
(Md.App. 1993). 
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provision, which was not part of their original agreement between the parties, and Pride was 
never asked to sign the Master Lease Agreement. (R. 1400, 1478).2 
6. Throughout their Brief, Homestead Defendants state that the 10th Circuit 
clearly recognized its decision would have a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect upon 
Pride's claims in the State Action. Homestead Defendants are mistaken because the 10th 
Circuit clearly stated that its decision related only to the 14th Hole Property and "[did] not 
preclude any pending or future actions involving claims relevant only to the Clark-
Pride Property:' {Homestead, 224 F. 3d at 1201 fn. 7). 
7. Throughout their Brief Homestead Defendants state that Pride's original 
Complaint does not contain the factual allegations for non-contractual claims such as 
promissory estoppel and/or detrimental reliance. Homestead Defendants are mistaken 
because the following allegations taken from Pride's original Complaint encompass these 
non-express contract theories of recovery. 
2
 The Federal Bankruptcy Court concluded that the loan agreement between 
Homestead Defendants and Pride did not require Pride to obtain subordination of its 
secured creditors to Homestead Defendants' loan and that the requirement of 
subordination was not part of the loan agreement. (R. 1369 and 1373). The Federal 
Bankruptcy Court also found that despite the fact that it was not required to do so under 
the original agreement between the parties, Pride attempted in good faith to obtain 
subordination from its creditors but was unsuccessful. Id. The Federal Bankruptcy Court 
concluded, as a matter of law, that Homestead Defendants' refusal to make the promised 
loan to Pride without the subordination of Pride's secured creditors was an anticipatory 
repudiation of the loan agreement between them. (R. 1373). The Federal District Court 
affirmed the Federal Bankruptcy Court on this issue (R. 1396). The Federal District 
Court was in turn affirmed by the 10th Circuit. {Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1198). 
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On or about March 9, 1988, Plaintiff informed Defendants 
(other than Valley) that, as a condition precedent to granting the 
permission requested by said Defendants to build the said Golf 
Course on portions of Plaintiffs property, Plaintiff needed 
sufficient funds to obtain the forbearance of Valley and other 
secured creditors from foreclosure during a period of two years 
or more during the construction of the golf course and pending 
the development and sale of Plaintiff s properties adjoining the 
proposed golf course. 
* * * 
During May and June of 1988, in reliance upon the 
representation of Defendants (other than Valley) that the 
loan of $185,000 would be made promptly, Plaintiff orally 
agreed with said Defendants to grant Homestead a license 
to construct a large portion of its proposed golf course upon 
portions of Plaintiff s properties in consideration of the said 
loan. 
* * * 
Based upon the said oral agreements . . . and in partial 
performance of said oral agreement, Plaintiffs' general 
partner executed a letter addressed to Midway City, Utah 
in the form prepared and requested by said Defendants . . 
. to assist him in obtaining a permit from the City of 
Midway for the construction of the said golf course, and 
Defendants did in fact use that letter to obtain a building 
permit and promptly thereafter began the construction of 
the golf course. 
* * * 
[Defendants have failed and refused to perform the oral 
agreement to make the said loan and to execute the 
proposed written agreement and have failed and refused to 
provide Plaintiff with any part of said loan save and except 
for the sum of $5,000 which was advanced to Plaintiffs on 
or about July 7,1988. 
* * * 
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Notwithstanding the aforesaid . . . breach of the oral agreement 
by said Defendants . . . Defendants proceeded to occupy 
portions of Plaintiffs' lands and have entered into a series 
of contracts with third persons for construction work and 
materials and have induced and directed third persons to 
enter upon Plaintiffs' land and to construct substantial 
portions of Defendants' proposed golf course on Plaintiffs' 
land and have cut down trees, removed topsoil, created 
road, dug trenches, removed fences, re-contoured land, 
installed signs and utilized the property for the storage and 
use of construction equipment and materials. Said 
Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiffs to take no immediate 
legal action against such intrusions and use of Plaintiffs' 
property by continuing to negotiate with Plaintiffs and by 
representing that their promises would be performed, but in fact 
said Defendants did not intend to perform the oral contract or to 
execute and perform the proposed written contract. 
* * * 
By reason of the foregoing, Defendants... have occupied and 
used large portions of Plaintiffs' properties without paying 
the agreed consideration, have damaged the property and, 
by reason of withholding the promised funds, have denied 
Plaintiff the ability to obtain a forbearance of its secured 
creditors in order to preclude foreclosure of the deeds of trust 
applicable to Plaintiffs' lands. 
* * * 
By reason of the foregoing Plaintiff was unable to provide 
its secured creditors with consideration for the forbearance 
of their rights to foreclose and Valley, despite its previous 
agreement to forebear if furnished consideration from the 
funds to be loaned by Defendant to Plaintiff, has foreclosed 
and purchased substantial portions of Plaintiff s property 
at foreclosure sales. 
(R. 5-8)(emphasis added). 
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8. Throughout their Brief, Homestead Defendants state that Pride never argued 
before the District Court that its original Complaint contained the allegations of promissory 
estoppel and implied contract. Homestead Defendants are mistaken because Pride clearly 
made this argument before the District Court. (R. 1430-31). 
9. At one point in their Brief Homestead Defendants contend that Pride lost its 
property because one of its creditors, Valley Bank, would not agree to forbear from 
foreclosure and thus Homestead Defendants' failure to make the $185,000 loan was of no 
consequence. Homestead Defendants are mistaken because Valley Bank was willing to 
enter into a forbearance agreement but not for $50,000, which was all that Pride was able 
to pay for the forbearance agreement without Homestead Defendants' $185,000 loan. (R. 
1337, 1412-13, 1498-1500; 920-923).3 
TJNDTSPUTED FACTS 
There are several undisputed facts material to the issues now before the Court on this 
appeal, and they are: 
1. Homestead Defendants have their golf course and Pride has nothing. (R. 1398-
1400; Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1195). 
3
 This assertion also goes to proximate cause, which is not an issue on appeal. 
Proximate cause had no application to the Motion to Amend and with respect to Pride's 
Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, causation/damages was not a subject of 
that Motion. In other words, Pride sought partial summary judgment on liability, leaving 
the issue of damages/causation for trial. (R. 1329). Consequently, whether Valley Bank 
would have accepted a sum greater than $50,000 to forbear on its foreclosure rights is 
irrelevant to the issues before the Court on this appeal. 
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2. Homestead Defendants orally agreed to lend Pride the sum of $ 185,000 so that 
Pride could make payment to certain of its secured creditors. (R. 1352). 
3. During the course of the Federal Action, Homestead Defendants took the 
position that this promise to loan Pride $185,000 related only to the Clark-Pride Property. 
{Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1201). 
4. As a result of that promise of a loan, on June 15, 1988, Pride signed the Letter 
of Commitment allowing Homestead Defendants to begin construction of their golf course. 
{Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1198; R. 846-48, 857, 1398-1403). 
5. Based upon that Letter of Commitment, the City of Midway, Utah granted a 
permit and Homestead Defendants began construction of the golf course. {Homestead, 224 
F.3datl l98;R. 1400). 
6. Construction of Homestead Defendants' golf course resulted in significant 
destruction of Pride's property. (R. 858). 
7. Following receipt of that Letter of Commitment, Homestead Defendants 
partially performed the loan agreement by issuing a check in the sum of $5,000 to one of 
Pride's secured creditors for the purpose of forestalling foreclosure of a portion of the Clark-
Pride Property, (R. 1353, 1368). 
8. The Federal Bankruptcy Court specifically found that this money represented 
part ofthe loan which Homestead Defendants had agreed to make to Pride. (R. 1353,1368). 
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9. After the golf course was substantially completed, Homestead Defendants 
refused to make the balance of the agreed loan unless Pride obtained the subordination of 
the loans of its secured creditors. {Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1198; R. 1370,1395). 
10. The issue of subordination was the subject of extensive litigation in the 
Federal Action, and the Federal Bankruptcy Court found that Homestead Defendants knew 
Pride was dependent upon the loan to obtain forbearance from its creditors and that 
Homestead Defendants' failure to fund the agreed loan would result and did result in Pride's 
loss of the property. (R. 1370). 
11. The Federal Bankruptcy Court expressly found that Homestead Defendants 
had induced Pride to permit construction of the golf course by representing they would loan 
Pride $185,000 to enable Pride to avoid foreclosure and that Pride had "reasonably relied" 
upon that representation by executing the Letter of Commitment. (R. 13 72)(emphasis added). 
12. The Federal Bankruptcy Court went on to conclude that the loan agreement 
between Homestead Defendants and Pride did not require Pride to obtain subordination of 
its secured creditors and that the requirement of subordination was not part of the loan 
agreement. (R. 1369 and 1373). 
13. The District Court likewise found that "by suggesting that the loan agreement 
could go ahead only if Pride obtained subordination agreements of all the lien holders, 
including Davis County Bank - a creditor that in no uncertain terms stated it would not 
subordinate - HGC [Homestead Defendants] effectively created an impossibility of 
performance." (R. 1395)(emphasis added). 
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14. In reliance upon the promised loan from Homestead Defendants, Pride never 
sought an alternative source of funding for forbearance agreements with its creditors. (R. 
1400). 
15. The Federal District Court found that there was no express contract between 
the parties, which was the basis for affirming the Federal Bankruptcy Court. (R. 1386). 
16. The 10th Circuit affirmed the District Court's finding of no express contract, 
but the 10th Circuit recognized that the doctrines of promissary estoppel and partial 
performance "might allow a remedy where no formal contract exists." {Homestead, 224 
F.3datl202fh. 9). 
17. The 10th Circuit, however, did not apply either doctrine because "Pride... did 
not advance arguments based upon these theories until its Reply Brief..." (Homestead, 
224 F. 3d at 1202 fn. 9). 
18. The 10th Circuit expressly stated that its holdings were "limited to the 
fourteenth hole property" and that "our decision therefore does not preclude any 
pending or future actions involving claims relevant only to the Clark-Pride Property." 
(Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1201 fn. 7)(emphasis added). 
THE 10tb CIRCUIT'S DECISION THAT ITS HOLDING WOULD 
NOT PRECLUDE PRIDE FROM PURSUING PENDING OR 
FUTURE CLAIMS RELATED TO THE CLARK-PRIDE PROPERTY 
IS ITSELF RES JUDICATA 
The 10th Circuit never expressed an opinion that its ruling on the 14th Hole Property 
would extend to Pride's claims to the Clark-Pride Property. In fact, the 10th Circuit 
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specifically stated that: "Because the scope of the complaint and subsequent finding of 
the bankruptcy court are limited to the fourteenth hole property, we do not address 
whether the parties entered into an agreement or contract relative to the Clark-Pride 
property. Our decision therefore does not preclude any pending or future actions 
involving claims relevant only to the Clark-Pride property." Homestead, 224 F.3d at 
1201 fn.7. Pride thus submits that this limitation which the 10th Circuit clearly imposed 
upon its own ruling is in fact res judicata on the issue of whether that decision applies to 
Pride's implied contract and promissory estoppel claims. Simply put, irrespective of the 
supremacy clause, the 10th Circuit stated the scope of its decision in Homestead and that 
ruling is binding because "federal law governs the collateral estoppel effect of a case 
decided by a federal court." See Clarkv. Columbia/HCA Information Services, Inc.,25 P.3d 
215, 224 (Nev. 2001); Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. Intern. Marketplace, 773 
F.2dl068, 1069 (9th Cir. 1985).4 
4
 Neither res judicata nor the doctrine of collateral estoppel are absolute defenses. 
While they are both generally applied as a matter of public policy to prevent the re-
litigation of claims, neither of these doctrines constitutes an absolute bar in all situations. 
They are judicially created. Hence, they are not automatically applied in every situation. 
LaSociete Anonyme v. Jean Patou, 495 F.2d 1265, 1276 (2nd Cir. 1974)(since the 
doctrine of res judicata is intended to serve the aims of fairness and efficient judicial 
administration, it need not and should not be applied mechanically when those goals are 
not served). Rather, these doctrines are only applied as public policy dictates. In other 
words, both doctrines are weighed against other competing interest and, on occasion, 
yield to other public policies. Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
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HOMESTEAD DEFENDANTS CONCEDE THAT THE FEDERAL 
BANKRUPTCY COURT NEVER HAD SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION OVER THE CLARK-PRIDE PROPERTY 
It is undisputed that the Federal Bankruptcy Court, Federal District Court and 10th 
Circuit lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Clark-Pride Property. (R. 1414-18). 
Because the Federal Action had no subject matter jurisdiction over the Clark-Pride 
Property, decisions made in the Federal Action did not affect the Clark-Pride Property or 
Pride's claims related to that property. See e.g. United States v. 51 Pieces of Real Estate 
Property Roswell New Mexico, 17F.3d 1306,1309 (10th Cir. 1994)(concluding that orders 
and judgments entered with respect to property over which a court has no subject matter 
jurisdiction are void and unenforceable). In its Opening Brief Pride argued the effect of this 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the Federal Action as to the Clark-Pride Property and 
how this precluded the 10th Circuit's decision in Homestead from triggering the doctrine of 
res judicata. {Pride's Opening Brief pp. 18-19). Homestead Defendants, however, failed 
to respond to that argument and for good reason: without subject matter jurisdiction over the 
Clark-Pride Property, Pride could not have litigated its claims related to that property in the 
Federal Action. Hence, res judicata or collateral estoppel would not arise as to those claims. 
See Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247-50 (Utah 1989). 
PRIDE'S THEORIES OF IMPLIED CONTRACT AND PROMISSORY 
ESTOPPEL DO NOT REQUIRE REOPENING OF DISCOVERY 
Homestead Defendants argue that if Pride is allowed to proceed under equitable 
theories of implied contract and/or promissory estoppel it will be severely prejudiced 
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because discovery will have to be reopened on issues such as: whether Pride's reliance upon 
the promise of a loan was reasonable? Pride does not agree that discovery needs to be 
reopened on that issue because the Federal Bankruptcy Court expressly found that 
Homestead Defendants had induced Pride to permit construction of the golf course by 
representing they would loan Pride $185,000 to enable Pride to avoid foreclosure and that 
Pride had reasonably relied upon that representation by executing the Letter of Commitment. 
(R. 1372). It is also undisputed that in reliance upon the promised loan from Homestead 
Defendants, Pride never sought an alternative source of funding for the forbearance 
agreements with its secured creditors. (R. 1400). But if additional discovery is required on 
the question of whether Pride reasonably relied on Homestead Defendants' promise of the 
$185,000 loan, it would be discovery of Pride and Pride's officers. In other words, the 
reasonableness of Pride's reliance has nothing to do with Homestead Defendants. More 
importantly, since no trial date has been set, there is nothing to preclude Homestead 
Defendants from undertaking this additional discovery. 
HOMESTEAD IS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DEATH OF 
VICE PRESIDENT LEMUEL STROUD 
Homestead Defendants argue that because its Vice President, Lemuel Stroud, died 
before the Federal Action was concluded, it would be "extremely prejudicial" to allow Pride 
to assert unew" theories based upon Stroud's conduct. {Homestead Defendants' Brief, pp. 
19-20). This argument ignores the fact that Stroud was repeatedly deposed and also testified 
several times in the Federal Action. Additionally, he was examined on the promise of the 
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$185,000 loan which forms the basis of Pride's so-called "new" theories of recovery and the 
fact of that promise having been made is undisputed: "Plaintiff [Homestead Defendants] 
and Defendant [Pride Stables] orally agreed that Plaintiff would lend Defendant the 
sum of $185,000 so that Defendant could make payment to certain of its secured 
creditors." (R. 1352)(emphasis added). 
THERE IS EVIDENCE OF FRAUDULENT INTENT ON BEHALF 
OF HOMESTEAD REGARDING THE SUBORDINATION 
Homestead Defendants argue that there is no evidence to support the claim that they 
never intended to honor the promise made to Pride regarding the $185,000 loan. But Pride 
submits that there is such evidence. In its Memorandum, Opinion and Order affirming the 
Federal Bankruptcy Court's decision, the Federal District Court found that Homestead 
Defendants knew Pride's creditors would not agree to subordinate. The District Court 
likewise found that "by suggesting that the loan agreement could go ahead only if Pride 
obtained subordination agreements of all the lien holders, including Davis County 
Bank - a creditor that in no uncertain terms stated it would not subordinate - HGC 
[Homestead] effectively created an impossibility of performance." (R. 1395). 
Based upon its review of the record, the Federal District Court affirmed the Federal 
Bankruptcy Court's decision that Homestead Defendants had anticipatorily repudiated their 
promise of a $185,000 loan to Pride by including the demand for subordination: "HGC 
[Homestead] was requesting (1) a performance it was not entitled to under the 
agreement; and (2) a performance HGC knew would be impossible for Pride to 
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accomplish." (R. 1396). Homestead Defendants'fraudulent intent in this matter is shown 
by the Letter of Commitment. Homestead Defendants knew prior to obtaining that Letter 
ofCommitmentthat Pride's creditors would not subordinate.5 (R. 1337,1412-13). Knowing 
this to be so, having the Letter of Commitment in hand and the golf course substantially 
completed, Homestead Defendants insisted upon subordination to avoid having to loan the 
$185,000 to Pride. Homestead Defendants' fraudulent intent is likewise shown by their 
false denial about knowing Pride's creditors would not subordinate prior to obtaining that 
Letter of Commitment. See McQueeney, 779 F.2d at 921-22; Shapak, 629 A.2d at 772. 
These facts would certainly support a judgment of fraud against Homestead Defendants and 
the District Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Homestead Defendants 
on Pride's fraud claims. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the Third District Court's Order granting Homestead 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court should also issue an Order 
reversing the Third District Court's denial of Pride's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and directing that partial summary judgment be entered as a matter of law in favor 
of Pride on its Causes of Action for breach of implied contract based upon part performance, 
5
 The Letter of Commitment, which was prepared by Homestead Defendants' 
attorney, represented that the agreement between the parties would be reduced to writing 
within two weeks. But Homestead Defendants delayed preparing the written agreements 
containing the impossible subordination provision until they had virtually completed 
their construction activities upon Pride's land. 
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promissory estoppel, and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, leaving 
only the issue of damages for trial on these claims. Finally, if claims for implied contract 
and promissory estoppel are not included in Pride's original Complaint, this Court should 
reverse the Third District Court's Order denying Pride's Motion for Leave to Amend, 
DATED this 24th day of March, 2003. 
SUITTERAXLAND 
c L^=^ 
Jesse C. Trentadue 
Michael W. Homer 
Attorneys for Appellant/Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of March, 2003,1 caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant Pride Stables to be served by first-class 
United States mail, postage pre-paid, to: 
Richard D. Burbidge, Esq. 
Steven B. Mitchell, Esq. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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